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ARTICLES
The Supreme Court Reaches Out And
Touches Someone-Fatally
By ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG*
Dooley said: "The supreme coort follow th ilection returns."'
Also, it would appear, the Court follows Ma Bell's TV commercials.
On August 10, during the summer recess, by an evening telephone con-
ference call, the Court reached out to vacate a stay of execution granted
by a lower court, touched a condemned man, Frank J. Coppola, and
dispatched him to the electric chair later that evening. The telephone
still has the edge over Federal Express.
The bizarre details are recounted in an article by Stuart Taylor, Jr.
in the New York Times, Wednesday, September 1, 1982.2 As confirmed
and amplified by Court records and officials, they are as follows.
At 7:25 p.m. on August 10, 1982, an application to vacate a stay of
execution granted a few hours earlier by Judge John D. Butzner, Jr., of
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in a Virginia capital case
(Coppola v. Commonwealth),3 was presented to the Chief Justice of the
United States, Warren E. Burger. The Court was officially on vacation.
* Former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.
The author has written both judicially and off the Court about his views on the death
penalty and was of the belief, as stated in his dissent to the denial of certiorari in Rudolph v.
Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963), that the death penalty was unconstitutional where the offense
involved was not the taking of life. In this view, he was joined by only two Justices, Brennan
and Douglas. Since then, his view has been adopted in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972). Since leaving the Court, the author has consistently expressed the view that the
death penalty at large continues to be unconstitutional. See Goldberg, The Death Penaltyfor
Rape, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1978); Goldberg, The Death Penalty and the Supreme
Court, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 355 (1973); Goldberg, Supreme Court Review, 1972-Foreword-
The Burger Court 1971 Tern" One Step Forward, Two Steps Backward?, 63 J. CRIM. L. &
POLICE SCIENCE 463 (1972); Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconsti-
tutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773 (1970).
1. F.P. DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (1901).
2. Taylor, When Weighing a Stay of Execution, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1982, at 20, col. 4.
3. 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 (1979).
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The regular Term of the Court was to commence on the first Monday
in October, 1982.
Chief Justice Burger had previously been alerted by telephone in
the early evening that an Assistant Attorney General of Virginia would
present the motion to vacate the stay. The motion was presented to the
Chief Justice at 7:25 p.m.4 Chief Justice Burger was empowered by law
to pass on the motion on his own.5 Instead, he elected to refer the
motion to the full Court. Normally, disposition of a motion when the
Court was on vacation would be deferred until the Court reconvened in
regular session in October, leaving the stay in effect until then.
Chief Justice Burger, however, chose not to follow this common
practice. Without awaiting a response from lawyers opposing the exe-
cution, the Chief Justice hastily arranged a telephone conference call to
the available members of the Court to discuss Virginia's motion and
decide it.6
Chief Justice Burger was able to reach by telephone only seven of
the eight associate Justices. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor could not be
reached, being outside of the United States.7
Of the seven associate Justices in the country, only three were in
Washington and at their homes, because of the lateness of the hour.
The other four were out of town; some were in attendance at the Amer-
ican Bar Association and American Judicature Society meetings then
under way in San Francisco. The seven associate Justices were alerted
shortly after 7:25 p.m. Eastern Standard Time by Court officials to ex-
pect a telephone conference call, arranged by the Chief Justice for 9:00
p.m." They were not advised, however, of the subject of the call.
Moreover, both in the cases of the associate Justices in Washington and
those out of town, the ten-page motion to vacate the stay and other
relevant documents pertaining to the case were obviously not at hand.
Without awaiting the response from lawyers opposing the execu-
tion, the telephone conference call took place at about 9:00 p.m. on
August 10, as arranged. A telephone vote was taken. Five Justices,
including the Chief Justice, voted to grant the motion to vacate the stay
of execution; three Justices voted to deny. At 10:25 p.m., a one-page
order 9 drafted by the Chief Justice was filed with the Clerk of the Court
4. Taylor, supra note 2, at col. 4.
5. See U.S. Sup. CT. R. 44.5, 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1982).
6. Taylor, supra note 2, at col. 5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Mitchell v. Lawrence, 103 S. Ct. 21 (1982) (mem.).
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in which five Justices (Burger, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehn-
quist) vacated the stay, without stating any reasons. The Court's sum-
mary order stated that Justices William J. Brennan and Thurgood
Marshall would have left the stay in effect, and Justice John Paul Ste-
vens was of the view that the Court should not pass on the motion
before hearing from the lawyers seeking to prevent the execution.
The Court's order was filed only three minutes after the lawyers
opposing the execution filed their response.' Obviously, this response
was not available to any of the members of the Court, including the
Chief Justice.
The Virginia authorities were then notified over the telephone by
officials of the Supreme Court less than an hour before the time fixed
for the execution that Virginia was free to proceed. Frank Coppola
was electrocuted on schedule at 11:25 p.m."
To complete the record, two petitions for certiorari had previously
been fied on Coppola's behalf in the Supreme Court, the first on De-
cember 29, 1979, and the second on November 9, 1981. Both were de-
nied.' 2 A number of other appeals had been filed with the Virginia
courts and also denied.' 3
The proceeding resulting in the stay of execution was a petition for
habeas corpus fied in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia."
Further, while Mr. Coppola had authorized his counsel to file the
two petitions for certiorari in the Supreme Court and other collateral
attacks on his death sentence in the state court, the petition for habeas
corpus in the federal district court was filed without his authorization
by his former attorneys and other counsel opposed to the death
sentence.'-'
Mr. Coppola was incarcerated in a death cell in the Virginia Peni-
tentiary and had been for several years during the legal maneuvering
challenging his sentence. Since he was safely confined, the question
arises as to why the customary procedure should not have been fol-
lowed and the state's motion to vacate the stay of execution referred to
the full Court when it reconvened for its next term in October. Had
10. Taylor, supra note 2, at col. 5.
11. See id.
12. Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 (1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1103 (1980); Coppola v. Warden, 222 Va. 369, 282 S.E.2d 10 (1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 927 (1982).
13. See, e.g., Coplola v. Warden, 222 Va. 369, 282 S.E.2d 10 (1981).
14. Lawrence v. Mitchell, No. CA82-0509R (E.D. Va. filed, decided Aug. 9, 1982).
15. Taylor, supra note 2, at col. 4.
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this traditional practice been followed, all of the members of the Court
would have been present and provided with the motion papers and re-
sponse before deciding the case. Why the haste and the recourse to the
telephone? The Court's one-page order does not explain.
There may be exigent circumstances necessitating disposition of a
case by a telephone conference call when the Court is not in session
and the members widely scattered. But no such circumstances are set
forth in the Court's order sending Coppola to the electric chair, nor do
any come to mind.
The procedure followed in the Coppola case is, in a sense, reminis-
cent of that employed by the Court in the notorious case involving the
Rosenbergs.16 In that case, Chief Justice Vinson, at the request of the
Attorney General, convened the Court in special session on June 18,
1953, after adjournment of the Court's regular session and the com-
mencement of its summer recess, to consider the government's applica-
tion to vacate a stay of execution granted by Justice Douglas on June
17.17 At the special session on June 18, the full Court heard oral argu-
ments lasting several hours from both parties. The Court held a
lengthy conference following the oral arguments in the afternoon of
June 18. It also held another conference in the morning of June 19.
This conference lasted several hours. Following the latter conference,
the Court issued a written per curiam opinion vacating Justice Doug-
las's stay and clearing the way for the execution of the Rosenbergs.'8
The per curiam, as is customary with unsigned opinions, was about one
and one-half pages in length reciting the reasons for vacating the stay.
Concurring opinions were filed by Justice Jackson and Justice Clark,
each about three and one-half pages. 19 The concurring opinions also
stated reasons for vacating the stay.
Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion of about five pages 0
and Justice Black a dissent of similar length,"' both giving reasons for
their dissents. Justice Frankfurter filed a one-paragraph statement-in
effect, a dissent-stating that he felt more deliberate consideration of
the case was required.22 He followed this with a lengthy dissent on
June 22.23
16. Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953) (per curiam).
17. See id. at 288.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 289, 293.
20. Id. at 310.
21. Id. at 296.
22. Id. at 289.
23. Id. at 301.
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As a result of the action of the Supreme Court vacating Justice
Douglas's stay, the Rosenbergs were executed at about 11 p.m. on June
19.
This recital is derived from the lengthy opinion written by Chief
Justice Vinson for the Court, which wak filed by him on July 16, after
the fact.24
There has been much justified criticism of the undue haste in this
disposition of the Rosenberg case, on the ground that there was no need
to reconvene the Court in special session during vacation.25 The
Rosenbergs, like Coppola, were in death cells and their case could like-
wise have been determined when the Court reconvened in October.
But, at least in the Rosenbergs' case, the full Court convened in person,
not by telephone; heard extensive oral arguments; held two lengthy
conferences; and, before sanctioning the execution, handed down opin-
ions, both in majority and dissent, giving reasons for the respective
points of view.
I have read the record of the Rosenbergs' case and I am convinced
of their guilt. But the undue haste with which the Court acted to send
them to the electric chair was not only violative of the deliberative jus-
tice expected of the Court, but has served to reinforce the views of
those who, wrongfully in my view, believe in their innocence. The
Court's image as an independent body, immune from the passions of
the moment, was impaired by the procedure followed in the Rosenberg
case. The same, I fear, is true to a greater degree with the procedure
followed in Coppola's case, which, as I have pointed out, was decided
in a brief telephone conference call, without consideration of the op-
posing response or the hearing of oral arguments, by a one-page order
giving no reason for the Court's action.
By contrast, a week after Coppola's execution, two Supreme Court
Justices declined to act with unseemly haste in a similar motion by the
State of Texas to vacate a stay of execution in a capital case, Bass v.
State .26
24. Id. at 277.
25. See, e.g., Note, Federal Court Procedure-Supreme Court's Power to Review Individ-
ual Justice's Stay of Execution: Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273 (1953), 32 TEx. L.
REv. 459 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Note, Federal Court Procedure]; Note, The Rosenberg
Case: Some Reflections on Federal Criminal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 219, 244-48 (1954); An
American Failure, 176 NATION 533 (1953); The Crime and Punishment of Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg, NEw REPUBLIC, June 29, 1953, at 6. But see Wrong by a Damn Sight, NEws-
WEEK, Mar. 1, 1954, at 72 (criticizing Note, Federal Court Procedure, supra).
26. 626 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), stay of execution grantedsub nom., Bass v.
Estelle, No. 82-2341 (5th Cir. Aug. 17, 1982).
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Justice White, acting on his own, denied Texas's motion to vacate
the stay of execution granted by a lower court.2 7 The State renewed its
motion before Justice Rehnquist. He referred the matter to the full
Court for determination when the Court reconvened in regular session
in October. 8
It has been suggested that the difference is that Coppola, rather
than prolong the agony after several appeals proved unavailing, de-
cided that he would rather be executed than prosecute other appeals.2 9
He consequently withdrew authorization to his lawyers to proceed fur-
ther. His doing so raised the legal question of their standing. But
standing is an esoteric legal subject, on which the Supreme Court has
sounded with an uncertain trumpet.30  At the very least, the proper
resolution of the difficult standing question would appear to require
briefing and oral argument. Also, since this was a death case and con-
demned persons have been known to change their minds about their
announced willingness to die, perhaps independent verification of such
intentions would be the counsel of wisdom.
If, unlike Bass, Coppola really had a death wish, perhaps it was
nurtured by his long confinement, due largely to the fact that the
Supreme Court itself had virtually imposed a moratorium on execu-
27. Estelle v. Bass, No. 82-2341 (5th Cir. application filed, denied Aug. 17, 1982).
28. Considerations for granting or denying a stay or vacation of a stay include:
1) whether the lower court decision rejecting the stay or vacation of stay was erroneous;
2) whether denial would work an irreparable injury to the applicant; and 3) whether the
issues presented by the case show a "substantial prospect that they will command four votes
for review." R. STERN & E. GROSSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 577-86 (4th ed., 1969).
In addition, a single Justice may refer an application for a stay or vacation of a stay to
the entire Court for determination. This type of referral usually occurs in cases involving
very important or complex questions. Id at 575. In fact, two such referrals occurred shortly
after the Coppola execution. Both were applications to vacate a stay of execution-one to
Justice White and subsequently to Justice Rehnquist, referred to above, and a separate one
to Justice Rehnquist. Both were referred to the entire Court for determination and both
were ultimately denied. Estelle v. Bass, 103 S. Ct. 36 (1982) (mem.); Estelle v. O'Bryan, 103
S. Ct. 285 (1982) (mem.).
Furthermore, it is perhaps not widely known that in regular Supreme Court procedure,
in order to determine whether a conference on a given case is desirable, the Chief Justice
circulates a "conference list" of pending cases. Unless a single Justice indicates that he
wishes to discuss a particular case, it will not be given detailed deliberation at conference.
Cf. R.H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 14-
15 (1955). It is established Supreme Court practice, however, that every death penalty case
is listed for discussion. In view of this established doctrine that all death penalty caes must
be fully discussed, there is all the more reason that this telephone procedure should not have
been followed.
29. See Taylor, supra note 2, at col. 4.
30. Compare Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), with Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128 (1978). Compare also Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952), with Abing-
ton School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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tions for more than a decade, and more importantly, had significantly
altered its views about capital punishment in a number of cases. 31 This
left Coppola and other condemned persons in death cells for prolonged
periods with their fate subject to pulling and hauling by the court.
More than a thousand condemned prisoners are in death cells
throughout the country32 and have been confined, as I have said, for
varying and lengthy periods of time. Coppola was in a death cell for
four years; others for much longer periods. These circumstances may
have affected Coppola's mental condition, which is a relevant legal fac-
tor in determining standing.33
Further, the request by a condemned prisoner to be executed and
to waive whatever legal rights he has is tantamount to the expression of
a desire to commit suicide. The government, by furthering that desire,
could be deemed to be aiding or promoting a suicide, which is a crime
in twenty-two states.34
Finally, in Coppola's case, while he had been denied certiorari by
the Supreme Court twice in seeking reversal of his conviction and sen-
tence, the proceeding that led to Judge Butzner's issuing a stay of exe-
cution was a habeas corpus action in the United States District Court in
Virginia. 5
The present Court has somewhat limited collateral review in fed-
eral habeas corpus proceedings where state courts have reviewed cases
on a direct appeal.36 Nevertheless, recourse to habeas corpus actions in
the federal courts, as a safeguard to protect a defendant's rights to con-
sider constitutional issues which have not been adequately considered
in state courts, is still preserved. And this is notwithstanding the fact
that the Supreme Court on direct review from a state's highest court
may have denied certiorari.37
The importance of preserving basic habeas corpus jurisdiction to
review collaterally what happens in state courts, was pointed out by
Justice Powell in a concurring opinion in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,38
31. Compare McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), with Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
32. 4 'MAore Palatable' Way of Killing, TIME, Dec. 20, 1982, at 28.
33. See generally 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law §§ 122-24 (1981).
34. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 401 (West 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.08 (West
1976); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.30 (McKinney 1975); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 2505 (Pur-
don 1973).
35. See Lawrence v. Mitchell, No. CA82-0509R (E.D. Va. fied, decided Aug. 9, 1982).
36. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 476 (1976).
37. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 488 (1953) (opinion by Frankfurter, J., stating
position of majority on this point).
38. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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with these words: "[H]abeas corpus. . . should provide the added as-
surance for a free society that no innocent [person] suffers an unconsti-
tutional loss of liberty.
39
For the reasons stated, it is my view that the manner in which the
Supreme Court disposed of the Coppola case is contrary to the Court's
best traditions and harmful to its role and image as a deliberative body
immune from extraneous considerations.4 ° Whatever one's view about
the constitutionality of the death penalty, due process of law encom-
passes an adequate hearing.
A distinguished United States district judge said to me recently
that he and his judicial colleagues interpret the Supreme Court's action
in the Coppola case as a signal to "get faster executions."
If justice delayed is justice denied, then justice dispensed in undue
haste by telephone and without access to the adversary position papers,
is also justice denied.
39. Id. at 256 (emphasis in original).
Interestingly, on January 24, 1983, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and stayed the
execution of Thomas Barefoot (scheduled for January 25). The parties ere ordered to brief
and argue "the question presented by the application, namely, the appropriate standard for
granting or denying a stay of execution pending disposition of an appeal by a federal court
of appeals by a death-sentenced federal habeas corpus petitioner." Barefoot v. Estelle, 596
S.W.2d 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 841 (1983) (mem.). This grant of
certiorari may be an indication of concern over the public reaction to the handling of the
Coppola case.
40. On Monday, March 22, 1983, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in another
death penalty case in order to determine whether the Constitution requires any specific form
of "proportionality review" by a court of statewide jurisdiction prior to the execution of a
state death sentence. Pulley v. Harris, 692 F.2d 1189 (1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3678
(U.S. Mar. 22, 1983) (No. 82-1095). The Court seems to be taking e% cry opportunity to
review death penalty cases as it continues, obviously, to be troubled by tha issues persistently
provoked by the widespread application of the death penalty.
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